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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of secret-key
agreement with public discussion subject to a peak power
constraint A on the channel input. The optimal input distribution
is proved to be discrete with finite support. The result is
obtained by first transforming the secret-key channel model
into an equivalent Gaussian wiretap channel with better noise
statistics at the legitimate receiver and then using the fact
that the optimal distribution of the Gaussian wiretap channel
is discrete. To overcome the computationally heavy search for
the optimal discrete distribution, several suboptimal schemes are
proposed and shown numerically to perform close to the capacity.
Moreover, lower and upper bounds for the secret-key capacity are
provided and used to prove that the secret-key capacity converges
for asymptotic high values of A, to the secret-key capacity with
an average power constraint A2. Finally, when the amplitude
constraint A is small (A→ 0), the secret-key capacity is proved
to be asymptotically equal to the capacity of the legitimate user
with an amplitude constraint A and no secrecy constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work considers the channel-type model with wiretapper
for secret-key agreement (CW model) [1], [2] which consists
of a transmitter, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. An
authenticated and noise-free public channel is made available
to the legitimate users, over which they can exchange an
arbitrary number of public messages that are assumed to be
perfectly observed by the eavesdropper. In this model, the
objective of the legitimate users is to agree on a sequence of
bits that should be kept secure from the eavesdropper. In [1],
the authors established the single-letter capacity expression of
the CW model for discrete channel input. Under continuous
channel input and an average power constraint, the secret-key
capacity is shown to be achieved by a Gaussian input with full
power [2]. In [3], the achievability of a positive key rate was
proved for memoryless binary channels when the destination
and the eavesdropper channels are conditionally independent.
In this work, the capacity of the CW model subject to a peak
amplitude constraint on the input is studied. The motivation
behind this work is twofold. First, determining the capacity of
a communication channel subject to various input constraints
is a classical problem of information theory. Second, the need
for incorporating an amplitude constraint is dictated by the
fact that several practical communication systems are subject
to a peak-power constraint or/and an average power constraint.
For instance, in visible light communications, and for safety
reasons, the modulating signal must satisfy an amplitude
constraint, rather than a conventional average power constraint.
The problem of finding capacity-achieving distributions
with an amplitude constraint has been addressed for several
channel models. In [4], Smith studied the capacity of the scalar
Gaussian channel subject to both a peak power constraint and
an average power constraint. The capacity-achieving distri-
bution, rather surprisingly, was shown to be discrete, with
a finite number of probability mass points. Following the
same approach, several works such in [5]–[8] showed that
the optimal capacity-achieving distributions are also discrete
for various channel models. In [9], the authors considered
the Gaussian wiretap channel with an amplitude constraint
on the channel input. The entire rate-equivocation region of
such channel was shown to be achieved by discrete input
distribution with finite support.
In this paper, the capacity-achieving input distribution for
the Gaussian CW model is proved to be also discrete with
finite support. The result is obtained by first transforming the
secret-key channel model into an equivalent Gaussian wiretap
channel with better noise statistics at the legitimate receiver
and then using the fact that the optimal distribution of the
Gaussian wiretap channel is discrete. The capacity-achieving
probability distribution has to be computed numerically relying
on a necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality condition. To circumvent the numerical complexity
associated with finding the capacity-achieving input distribu-
tion, suboptimal schemes are proposed and shown numerically
to perform close to the capacity. Finally, lower and upper
bounds for the secret-key capacity are derived. Based on these
bounds, the behavior of the secret-key capacity for asymptotic
high and low values of A is characterized. For instance, the
secret-key capacity with an amplitude constraint converges for
asymptotic high values of A, to the secret-key capacity with an
average power constraint A2. When the amplitude constraint
A is small (A→ 0), the secret-key capacity is asymptotically
equal to the capacity of the legitimate user with an amplitude
constraint A and no secrecy constraint.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The Gaussian CW model for secret-key agreement [1] is
defined by
Yi = Xi +NDi , i = 1 . . . n
Zi = Xi +NEi , i = 1 . . . n,
(1)
where n is the number of channel uses. Xi, Yi and Zi denote
the channel input, the legitimate receiver’s observation, and
the eavesdropper’s observation, respectively. NDi and NEi are
independent and identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian
random variables with variances σ2D and σ2E , respectively. The
channel input Xi is assumed to have an amplitude constraint
|Xi|≤ A, i = 1, . . . n. (2)
A single-letter characterization of the secret-key capacity
of the CW model with conditional probability distribution
function (PDF) p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|x) is established in
[1] for the case of discrete channel alphabets. Following the
extension to continuous channel alphabets with input average
power constraint [2, Theorem 1], the secret-key capacity with
a peak amplitude constraint can be expressed in a single-letter
form as follows.
Lemma 1. The secret-key capacity of the CW model
(X,Y, Z) with conditional PDF p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|x) and
a peak amplitude constraint is given by
Ck = sup
FX∈Ω
[I(X; Y )− I(Y ;Z)] = sup
FX∈Ω
I(X;Y |Z), (3)
where the supremum is over all input probability distribu-
tions FX in Ω ,
{
FX :
∫ A
−A
dFX(x) = 1
}
.
The secret-key capacity can be further expressed as
Ck = sup
FX∈Ω
[I(X; Y,Z)− I(X;Z)]. (4)
In the sequel, the input distribution achieving the secret-key
capacity is characterized.
III. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY
The capacity-achieving probability distribution is discrete
with a finite number of probability mass points. This is
formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let F0 be a solution to (3). Then, the support set
of F0, SF0 , is a finite set of points.
Proof: From (4), the secret-key rate I(X ;Y, Z)−I(X,Z)
is equivalent to a secrecy rate in which the destination is
provided with the eavesdropper observation. In particular,
I(X ;Y, Z) is the rate of channel given by YDE = hX + N ,
such that YDE =
(
Y
Z
)
, h =
(
1
1
)
, and N =
(
ND
NE
)
. Note
that that covariance of N is given by ∆ =
(
σ2D 0
0 σ2E
)
. Let
B =
(
1
σD
0
0 1
σE
)
. It follows that B∆BT = I . As Bh is a
column vector, its singular-value decomposition is given by
Bh = V ‖Bh‖1, with V = Bh‖Bh‖ . Therefore,
I(X;Y,Z) = I(X;hX +N) = I(X;V TBhX + V TBN)
= I(X;X +
1
‖Bh‖V
T
BN
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Neq
). (5)
Therefore, the rate I(X ;Y, Z) corresponds equivalently to
a channel with input X and a single output, Yeq = X +Neq
and with an equivalent noise variance given by
var(Neq) =
1
‖Bh‖2 V
T
B∆BTV =
1
1
σ2
D
+ 1
σ2
E
, σ
2
DE. (6)
This says that the secret-key model is equivalent to a
Gaussian wiretap channel with the legitimate receiver having a
better noise variance given by (6). Since var(Neq) < σ2E , the
eavesdropper’s channel is a stochastically degraded channel.
Therefore, the optimization problem is equivalent to a Gaus-
sian wiretap channel with an amplitude constraint problem,
for which the existence of a capacity-achieving distribution
and its discreteness follow along similar lines as in [9, Proof
of Corollary 1].
Remark 1. The equivalent channel given by (5) may also be
established using the fact that a sufficient statistic to decode
X reliably from (Y, Z) is Y
σ2
D
+ Z
σ2
E
, along with the fact that a
sufficient statistic preserves the mutual information. It follows
I(X;Y,Z) = I(X;
Y
σ2D
+
Z
σ2E
) = I(X;X +Neq). (7)
The secret-key capacity-achieving distribution can be found
via a classical search algorithm as in [4]. Briefly, at each
step, the number of mass points is increased by unity and
the optimal input distribution for given the current number of
mass points is determined numerically. The process is repeated
until the KKT conditions given by [9, Equations 20 and 21]
are satisfied. However, such an optimization is computationally
hungry, especially as the value of A increases. This moti-
vates the search for suboptimal, but efficient schemes that
circumvent the complexity of finding the capacity-achieving
distribution.
IV. SUBOPTIMAL INPUT DISTRIBUTIONS AND BOUNDS
For each of the following schemes, the secret-key rate is
evaluated using a unified approach. Following the proof of
Theorem 1, the secret-key channel is transformed into an
equivalent Gaussian wiretap channel. Starting from (4) and
using (6), the secret-key rate can be expressed as
I(X;Y,Z) − I(X,Z) = I(X,X +Neq)− I(X;X +NE) (8)
= h(X +Neq)− h(X +NE) + 1
2
log(
σ2E
σ2DE
).
Thus, in order to evaluate the secret-key rate, one only needs
to evaluate the PDF of a generic random variable Y = X+N
where N is an independent Gaussian noise and X follows a
specific distribution that satisfies the peak constraint (2).
A. Suboptimal input distributions
One may consider suboptimal discrete input distributions
such as maxentropic distributions considered in [10]. Maxen-
tropic distributions are probability distributions over a fixed
number K of equally spaced mass points that maximize
the entropy of all admissible discrete distributions. In the
current setting, maxentropic distributions are simply uniform
distributions over the equally spaced mass points. One can
then optimize over the number of mass points K to achieve
better performance.
The continuous uniform distribution maximizes the entropy
of the input subject to an amplitude constraint [11]. In order
to evaluate the secret-key achieved by a uniform input distri-
bution, one needs to evaluate the PDF of a random variable
T = X +N where N is an independent Gaussian noise. The
following lemma characterizes such PDF.
Lemma 2. Let X ∼ U(−A,A), N ∼ N (0, σ2) and T =
X +N . Then the PDF of T , pT (t), is given by
pT (t) =
1
2A
[
Q(−A− t
σ
)−Q(A− t
σ
)
]
, (9)
where Q denotes the Q-function defined as Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
x
exp(−u2
2
)du and U(−A,A) designates the uniform
PDF over [−A,A].
2
In case of an average power constraint only, the optimal
input distribution is Gaussian. This suggests considering a
truncated Gaussian input distributions, denoted as NA(0, σ2x).
The PDF of the truncated Gaussian is given as
pX(x) =
1
σxD
φ(
x
σx
) ∀x ∈ [−A,A], (10)
where D = Φ( A
σx
) − Φ(− A
σx
), φ(·) and Φ(·) correspond
to the PDF and the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution, respectively. Unlike the uniform
distribution, such an input distribution provides the flexibility
of optimizing over its parameter σ2x to achieve higher rates
[12]. As in the previous section, one needs to evaluate the
PDF of a generic random variable T = X +N where X is a
truncated Gaussian and N is an independent Gaussian random
variable. This is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let X ∼ NA(0, σ2x), N ∼ N (0, σ2) and T =
X +N . Then the PDF of T , pT (t), is given by
pT (t) = g(t)w(t), (11)
where g(·) and w(·) are given by:
g(t) =
1√
2pi(σ2 + σ2x)
exp(− t
2
2(σ2 + σ2x)
) (12)
w(t) =
Q(−A−t
σ˜2
σ2
σ˜
)−Q(A−t
σ˜2
σ2
σ˜
)
D
. (13)
Proof: See Appendix.
An analytic expression for the optimal input variance σ2x is
difficult to obtain. However, based on numerical observations,
σ2x can be set to a simple heuristic value given by σˆ2x = A2.
B. Lower and Upper bounds
Based on (8), the secret-key capacity can be lower bounded
as follows
Ck = max
pX(x)
[I(X,X +Neq)− I(X;Z)]
≥ max
pX(x)
I(X,X +Neq)− max
pX(x)
I(X;Z) (14)
= CBE − CE , CLBk,1 , (15)
where CBE corresponds to the capacity of the enhanced
receiver channel with input X and output Y
σ2
D
+ Z
σ2
E
and CE
corresponds to the capacity of the eavesdropper channel. Hav-
ing closed-form expressions is of interest in many scenarios.
Next, closed-form lower bounds are provided. Considering (8)
and using [13, Theorem 1], the following lower bounds follow
immediately
Ck ≥
1
2
log(1 +
2A2
σ2
DE
pie
)− (1− 2Q(β + A
σE
)) log(
2(β + A
σE
)
√
2pi(1 − 2Q(β)) )
−Q(β)− β√
2pi
e−
β2
2 +
1
2
, CLBk,2 (16)
Ck ≥
1
2
log
6 A
2
σ2
DE
+ 3pie
pieA
2
σ2
E
+ 3pie
, CLBk,3 , (17)
where β > 0 is a free parameter. Since (16) holds true for
any β > 0, one may maximize CLBk,2 over all β. Following [13,
Theorem 1], (16) and (17) can be derived by using the dual
expression for the secrecy capacity and choosing a particular
distribution that results in a secrecy achievable rate.
Clearly, The secret-key capacity with an amplitude con-
straint A is upper bounded by the secret-key capacity with
an average power constraint A2. It follows that
Ck ≤ 1
2
log(1 +
A2σ2E
(A2 + σ2E)σ
2
D
) , CUBk . (18)
C. Asymptotic analysis
First, the secret-key capacity is investigated for asymptoti-
cally high values of A.
Proposition 1. The secret-key capacity with amplitude con-
straint coincides with the secret-key capacity with an average
power constraint and converges to 1
2
log(1 +
σ2E
σ2
D
) as A goes
to infinity.
Proof: Setting β = log(1+ 2A
σE
) as in [13], it can be seen
that the upper bound CUBk and the lower bound CLBk,2 converge
to the same value for asymptotically high values of A, given
by 1
2
log(1 +
σ2E
σ2
D
). Thus, one obtains
lim
A→∞
Ck = lim
A→∞
C
LB
k,2 (β
∗) = lim
A→∞
C
UB
k =
1
2
log(1 +
σ2E
σ2D
).
When A is very small, the behavior of the secret-key
capacity is similar to the capacity in the absence of an
eavesdropper.
Proposition 2. In the regime A
σDE
<< 1, the secret-key
capacity behaves as the capacity of the legitimate user channel
with no secrecy constraint as follows
lim
A
σDE
→0
Ck
1
2
A2
σ2
D
= 1. (19)
Proof: First, the asymptotic equivalent expression of the
capacity for a Gaussian channel with no secrecy constraint is
established. The result is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider a Gaussian channel with amplitude
constraint A with capacity C given by Y = X + N such
that N ∼ N (0, σ2). Then, it follows that
lim
A
σ
→0
C
A2
2σ2
= 1. (20)
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume σ = 1 (in
which case A represents is the signal amplitude to noise
standard deviation ratio). A lower bound of C is obtained
by considering an equal pair of mass points at the interval
extremes as a particular input distribution. The rate in this
case is
R = h(Y )− 1
2
log(2pie), (21)
where h(Y ) corresponds to the entropy of a mixed Gaussian
distribution. From [14], h(Y ) is given by
h(Y ) =
1
2
log(2pie) +A2 − I
I =
2√
2piA
exp(−A
2
2
) (22)
×
∫ ∞
0
exp(− y
2
2A2
) cosh(y) log(cosh(y))dy (23)
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So that one obtains
R = A2 − I. (24)
An upper bound of C is the capacity with average power
constraint A2. On the other hand, R ≥ A2
2
− I . Thus, one
obtains
A2
2
− I ≤ C ≤ 1
2
log(1 +A2) (25)
Clearly,
lim
A→0
1
2
log(1 + A
2
2
)
A2
2
= 1. (26)
Now, it remains to prove that
lim
A→0
I
A2
2
= 0 ⇐⇒ lim
A→0
I
A2
= 0. (27)
For that, one writes
I
A2
=
2√
2pi
∫
∞
0
1
A3
exp(−A
2
2
) exp(− y
2
2A2
) cosh(y) log(cosh(y))dy.
(28)
= ET
[
2
A2
log cosh(AT )]
]
, (29)
with T is a mixed Gaussian distribution ∼ fT (t) =
1√
2pi
exp(− t2+A2
2
) cosh(At). Using the inequality cosh(x) ≤
exp(x
2
2
), we have,
ET [
2
A2
log cosh(AT )]] ≤ ET [T 2] = 1 +A2. (30)
Note that the right-hand side term of (30) is bounded as A→
0. Similarly, using the inequality exp(x) ≤ cosh(x), we write
ET [
2
A2
log cosh(AT )]] ≥ ET [ 2
A
T ] = 0. (31)
On the other hand,
∀y > 0, lim
A→0
1
A3
exp(−A
2
2
) exp(− y
2
2A2
) = 0 (32)
Then, combining (30), (31), (32) and applying the dominated
convergence theorem, it follows
lim
A→0
I
A2
= 0, (33)
which implies
lim
A→0
A2
2
− I
A2
2
= 1. (34)
Therefore, combining (25), (26) and (34), one obtains
lim
A→0
C
A2
2
= 1. (35)
Going back to the proof of Proposition 2 and assuming that
A
σDE
<< 1, it follows that A
σE
<< 1 and A
σD
<< 1. Applying
A2
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Fig. 1. The secret-key and secrecy capacities versus the square of the peak
amplitude constraint A.
the result of Lemma 4 to (15), one obtains
lim
A
σDE
→0
CLBk,1
A2
2σ2
D
=
σ2D
σ2DE
lim
A
σDE
→0
(
CBE
A2
2σ2
DE
)− σ
2
D
σ2E
lim
A
σDE
→0
(
CE
A2
2σ2
E
).
=
σ2D
σ2DE
− σ
2
D
σ2E
= 1. (36)
Moreover, from (18), one obtains
lim
A
σDE
→0
CUBk
A2
2σ2
D
= lim
A
σDE
→0
log(1 + A
2
σ2
D
(1+ A
2
σ2
E
)
)
A2
σ2
D
= 1. (37)
The result follows by combining (36) and (37).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate
the analytical derivations. Figure 1 illustrates numerically the
result in Theorem 1 by computing the secret-key capacity
for σ2D = 1 and σ2E = 2. The secret-key capacity with an
average power constraint A2, denoted CUBk , is also visualized.
For comparison, Fig. 1 illustrates the secrecy capacity under
an amplitude constraint Cs, the secrecy capacity under an
average power constraint Cavg−csts , the lower bounds CLBk,1
and CLBk,3 (CLBk,2 is negative over the considered range) and
a lower bound to the secrecy capacity Cm − Ce, with Cm
being the capacity of the legitimate receiver. It is observed that
the rate of increase of Ck and Cavg−cstk are the same, which
parallels the observations for the capacity with no secrecy
constraint [4] and the secrecy capacity [9]. For low values of
A, one observes that the secret-key capacity with an amplitude
constraint coincides with its lower bound CLBk,1 and is very
close the secret-key capacity with an average power constraint.
It is worth noting that as A grows, the optimal number of mass
points, as well as the optimization complexity, increases.
Next, the performance of the proposed suboptimal schemes is
illustrated in Fig. 2. The noise variances are set to σD = 1
and σE = 1.5. The maxentropic distribution coincides with
the secret-key capacity for low values of A and achieves
near capacity rates for higher values of A. Moreover, the
heuristic choice of K behaves very close to the optimized
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maxentropic distribution. On the other hand, the continuous
uniform distribution and the truncated Gaussian perform less
efficiently for low values of A. However, for high values of A,
the truncated Gaussian distribution (as well as the one with the
heuristic choice of σx = A) outperforms all other suboptimal
schemes and achieves rates very close to the capacity.
Finally, Fig. 3 illustrates numerically the convergence of
CLBk,2 (β
∗) and CUBk to the same limit as A goes to infinity,
which confirms the result in Proposition 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the capacity-achieving probability distribution
of the channel model for secret-key agreement is studied. The
optimal distribution is proved to discrete with finite number
of probability mass points. To circumvent the numerical com-
plexity associated with finding the optimal input distribution,
several schemes are proposed and shown numerically that they
perform close to the capacity. Moreover, upper and lower
bounds to the secret-key capacity are provided and used
to prove that that the secret-key capacity under amplitude
constraint A coincides with the capacity under an average
power constraint A2 for asymptotically high values of A.
Finally, it is shown that, when A is small, the secret-key
capacity behaves as the capacity with an amplitude constraint
A and no secrecy constraint.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
f(y)
=
∫ A
−A
f(y|x)dF (x) (38)
=
1
D
√
2piσ2x
√
2piσ2
∫ A
−A
exp(− x
2
2σ2x
) exp(− (x− y)
2
2σ2
)dx (39)
=
1
D
√
2piσ2x
√
2piσ2
exp(− y
2
2σ2
)
∫ A
−A
exp(− x
2
2σ˜2
) +
xy
σ2
dx (40)
=
exp(− y2
2σ2
(1− σ˜2
σ2
))
D
√
2piσ2x
√
2piσ2
∫ A
−A
exp(− (x− y
σ˜2
σ2
)2
2σ˜2
)dx (41)
=
exp(− y2
2(σ2+σ2x)
)√
2pi(σ2 + σ2x)
1
D
1√
2piσ˜2
∫ A
−A
exp(− (x− y
σ˜2
σ2
)2
2σ˜2
)dx (42)
=
exp(− y2
2(σ2+σ2x)
)√
2pi(σ2 + σ2x)
1
D
P (N (y σ˜
2
σ2
, σ˜
2) ∈ [−A,A]) (43)
=
exp(− y2
2(σ2+σ2x)
)√
2pi(σ2 + σ2x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(y)
1
D
P (N (0, 1) ∈ [−A− y
σ˜2
σ2
σ˜
,
A− y σ˜2
σ2
σ˜
])︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(y)
,
(44)
where (40) is obtained by setting 1
σ˜2
, 1
σ2x
+ 1
σ2
. Equation
(41) follows form the fact that 1−
σ˜2
σ2
σ2
= 1
σ2+σ2x
, multiplying
the numerator and the denumerator by
√
2piσ˜2 and the identity
σ˜2
σ2xσ
2 =
1
σ2+σ2x
. Finally, note that w(y) can be expressed in
terms of the Q function as in (13).
REFERENCES
[1] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “Common randomness in information theory
and cryptography. i. secret sharing,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 39,
no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, Jul 1993.
[2] T. F. Wong, M. Bloch, and J. M. Shea, “Secret sharing over fast-fading
MIMO wiretap channels,” EURASIP J WIREL COMM, vol. 2009, p. 8,
2009.
[3] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742, May
1993.
[4] J. G. Smith, “The information capacity of amplitude-and variance-
constrained sclar Gaussian channels,” Information and Control, vol. 18,
no. 3, pp. 203–219, 1971.
[5] T. H. Chan, S. Hranilovic, and F. R. Kschischang, “Capacity-achieving
probability measure for conditionally Gaussian channels with bounded
inputs,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 2073–2088, 2005.
[6] A. Tchamkerten, “On the discreteness of capacity-achieving distribu-
tions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 50, no. 11, pp. 2773–2778, Nov
2004.
[7] H. Lei, H. Zhang, I. Ansari, C. Gao, Y. Guo, G. Pan, and K. Qaraqe,
“Performance analysis of physical layer security over generalized- k
fading channels using a mixture gamma distribution,” IEEE Commun.
Lett, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 408–411, Feb 2016.
[8] A. Agrawal, Z. Rezki, A. J. Khisti, and M.-S. Alouini, “Noncoherent
capacity of secret-key agreement with public discussion,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 565–574, 2011.
[9] O. Ozel, E. Ekrem, and S. Ulukus, “Gaussian wiretap channel with
amplitude and variance constraints,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 61,
no. 10, pp. 5553–5563, 2015.
[10] A. Farid and S. Hranilovic, “Channel capacity and non-uniform sig-
nalling for free-space optical intensity channels,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun, vol. 27, no. 9, pp. 1553–1563, December 2009.
[11] K. Conrad, “Probability distributions and
maximum entropy.” [Online]. Available:
http://www.math.uconn.edu/∼kconrad/blurbs/analysis/entropypost.pdf
5
[12] A. Chaaban, Z. Rezki, and M.-S. Alouini, “On the capacity of the
intensity-modulation direct-detection optical broadcast channel,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2016.
[13] A. Mostafa and L. Lampe, “Physical-layer security for MISO visible
light communication channels,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun, vol. PP,
no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2015.
[14] J. V. Michalowicz, J. M. Nichols, and F. Bucholtz, “Calculation of
differential entropy for a mixed gaussian distribution,” Entropy, vol. 10,
no. 3, pp. 200–206, 2008.
6
